JHE BIG the wars of the 20th century revolved around counter-offensives: the Allied landings in Normandy; Douglas MacArthur’s surprise attack at Inchon during the Korean War; Norman Schwarzkopf’s “left hook” to cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Now Ukraine, with a fifth of its territory in Russian hands, hopes to join that list. But a much-vaunted operation in southern Kherson province appears to have been overhyped. It may be intentional.
For months, Ukrainian officials have hinted that an attack in the south was imminent. End of July, supplied by the United States HIMARS rocket launchers began destroying bridges to the city of Kherson to isolate Russian forces west of the Dnieper. These were “serious preparatory steps” towards the liberation of the town, a local official said. An update provided by British intelligence officials on July 28 said that “Ukraine’s counter-offensive in Kherson is gaining momentum”. On August 9, a spectacular attack on Russia’s Saky air base in Crimea, beyond the range of Ukraine’s known weapons, was described by Ukrainian officials as the start of this offensive. Kherson would be liberated by the end of the year, boasted Dmytro Marchenko, a Ukrainian general.
These high expectations will be difficult to meet. HIMARS the attacks softened the Russian defences, in particular by preventing artillery from reaching the front lines. On August 13, Ukraine said it had destroyed a bridge over the Nova Kakhovka dam, tightening the noose around the city. But only infantry can capture territory. Conventional wisdom holds that attacking forces need three times as many troops as there are defenders to capture a well-defended position; more in urban areas. If Ukraine ever had such an advantage, it no longer has one.
In recent weeks, Russia, anticipating an offensive from the south, withdrew its forces from Izyum on the eastern front and reinforced Kherson and its surroundings. Refugees who have recently left the city say they have seen dozens of new Russian army vehicles and troops, especially near Nova Kakhovka. Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, a company that tracks the war, believes there were 13 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the province at the end of July (a BTG usually has several hundred soldiers, although most are exhausted these days). Now there could be 25 to 30. “We now believe that window of opportunity has passed,” says Muzyka. “The Ukrainians don’t have enough manpower to match the Russian numbers.”
Although Ukraine has a large pool of troops, most of them are conscripts with training days. The most demanding battles were fought by just five brigades of Ukraine’s most experienced and skilled soldiers, notes Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank. These units are exhausted and have suffered heavy casualties. Training new brigades and equipping them for an offensive will take time.
Attacking generally requires more ammo than defending. Attacking forces tend to cause more casualties. “Since 1992, in our field exercises, we have not studied offensive actions,” lamented Sergiy Grabskyi, reserve colonel in the Ukrainian army, speaking on the “Geopolitics Decanted” podcast on August 3. “After eight years of war, Ukrainian forces are brilliant in defensive actions, but they have very limited or almost no experience in conducting large-scale offensive actions.” Ukrainian counterattacks around Kharkiv in May, while successful, were modest and resulted in many casualties.
The Russian army had time to prepare. For months they have been digging trenches in Kherson and trucking into the fortifications. They may already have trained artillery on the roads that Ukraine would use to advance. “If the Ukrainian assault looks like Russia’s attack on Severodonetsk, it’s probably a stalemate,” says Chris Dougherty, a former Pentagon planner, referring to a town Russia captured in June using weapons. crude tactics and heavy artillery bombardment. “It will cost Ukraine dearly in scarce manpower and materials, and it would probably be the last major Ukrainian operation of 2022.”
Mr Dougherty said Ukraine should take an indirect approach: isolating the city of Kherson and using irregular forces and artillery to choke off Russian supply lines “would weaken Russia’s defence”. A drumbeat of partisan attacks, as well as recent strikes against Russian arms depots and command posts, suggest this may be Ukraine’s real strategy. Some Ukrainian officials say they are content to wait, while regularly exhausting Russian forces with such attacks. “We want to avoid street warfare, because we don’t want to destroy the city,” says Major Roman Kovalyov, based in northeastern Kherson province. “We want to surround them and force them to retreat. We want to wring them out.
But encouraging the idea that a ground offensive is imminent has certain advantages. This boosts the morale of civilians in occupied Kherson. This keeps the Russian forces – already battered by artillery – on their toes. And that forces Russia to divert its forces from the eastern Donbass region, weakening its ongoing attacks on the city of Sloviansk. The bluster of a counter-offensive might even be a feint, drawing the Russians to Kherson and opening gaps in the Russian line elsewhere that could be exploited.
The problem for Ukraine is that its political and military strategies are in tension. Volodymyr Zelensky, the country’s president, is eager to show his Western supporters that the weapons and ammunition they have dumped in Ukraine are making a difference and that the economic hardships of war, such as Europe’s energy crisis , are not in vain. The Russian army also replaces lost men over time. That, and the muddier terrain in the fall, could make an offense more difficult in a few months. “Right now we have a unique chance and window of opportunity,” Colonel Grabskyi said, noting that a push from Zaporizhia to the Sea of Azov could cut Russia’s so-called land bridge to the sea. Crimea.
The risk is that over-the-top counter-offensives that don’t materialize end up hurting morale. But if attacks took place and sparkled, the disillusion would be even worse. A politically motivated offensive, disregarding military realities, would be “a very bad idea” says a seasoned military analyst, “but we may not be able to control what they are doing and where.” The analyst points to Severodonetsk, where Mr Zelensky reportedly overruled military advice and insisted his armed forces defend the city for much longer than was prudent. “They barely made it out alive,” he said. If Ukraine is embarking on a counter-offensive, he says, it should be methodical and gradual: ousting Russia from the city of Kherson, but stopping at the Dnieper and advancing east only when military circumstances improve. improve.
The tension between political imperatives and military calculations is not new. In 1942, America and the Soviet Union wanted the Allies to open a second front in France. Stalin hoped this would ease the pressure on the Eastern Front; Roosevelt wanted to show Americans progress at home. Winston Churchill and some American generals disagreed, largely on the grounds that their armies were not ready. A Canadian-led Allied raid on Dieppe in the summer of 1942, in which more than half of the invasion force’s 6,000 men were killed, wounded or captured, was staged for largely political reasons. He pointed out the risks of going early. There are lessons here for Mr. Zelensky.■