SAMUEL HUNTINGTON was almost right. The late American professor burst a bubble of Western triumphalism with a dark prediction of conflicts in “The clash of civilizations?” in 1993. Where he made a mistake is the means by which this friction would take place. Rather than civilizations rubbing against each other as groups of nation states, as predicted by Mr. Huntington, the twenty-first century is witnessing the rise of “state-civilization.”
The term is in vogue. Chinese academics view China as the only civilization state in the world, rather than a 19th century nation state. Vladimir Putin, however, took a leap forward, saying that Russia’s status as a state of civilization has prevented the country from “dissolving in this diverse world.” Indian commentators have long struggled to find out if their country is one too. Other potential candidates for state of civilization include the United States and even Turkey. Another name is rarely mentioned, but should be added to this growing list: the EU.
A world of states of civilization, where the state protects (and projects) an entire civilization rather than a single nation, EU pretty good. The block would no longer be a duckbill geopolitical platypus, occupying its own bizarre category. Although it is clearly more than a union, it is still far from being a nation state. It has its own currency, its fiscal rules and regulates everything from the size of the strawberry to the emissions from cars. It controls the essential parts of state sovereignty, such as customs, as well as migration between its member states. And in the decades to come, it will likely build something that looks like a small army and even control its borders. But the EU member states still have far more powers over much of domestic policy, and even more foreign.
EU leaders from all walks of life began to speak of civilization. Viktor Orban, Hungarian Prime Minister, has long formulated his attacks against refugees in defense of European civilization. The European Commission has just proposed its own rather bloodless and bureaucratic version of civilization by introducing a commissioner responsible for “protecting the European way of life”, responsible for security, migration and integration. (After an uproar, the title was returned with a touch of linguistic gymnastics to “Promoting our European way of life”.) Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, speaks of European civilization in existential terms, demanding that the bloc should regroup or be replaced by China and America.
These visions of European civilization are different, which is potentially a problem. Mr Orban assimilates European civilization to white Christianity, while the committee at least tries to rely on civic values. Mr. Macron focuses on the geopolitical strength of America and China, which could undermine the values of the Enlightenment represented by Europe. However, they share common themes.
All, for example, are defensive. European leaders are talking about protecting Europe. Rather than engaging in political evangelism, EU abandons universalism, even if the states of civilization naturally tend to be expansive. Where European leaders once spoke of “Western” values, they increasingly speak of European values. America has taken a nativist turn and Brexit Great Britain is following suit. In such circumstances, a renewed interest in a specific European civilization – and how to defend it – is only natural.
Unfortunately, gossip about civilizations can quickly become paranoid. The far right peddles conspiracy theories about the replacement of European civilization, whether by immigrants or rising powers like China. Such discourse is now taken up by moderate politicians. “We know that civilizations are disappearing,” said Macron last summer, warning that Europe would also be wiped out unless it fundamentally changes. A shared apocalyptic vision could link populist law to the European project, but it would do so only at the high cost of Europe’s self-proclaimed values.
Likewise, the renewed emphasis on European civilization is exclusive. In his book “The Rise of the Civilizational State”, Christopher Coker argues that questions of culture rather than political ideology are now the motto of politics. Such a change alters the fundamental question posed to citizens, as Mr. Huntington explained two decades ago. If politics and economics dominate, then the question is “what do you think?” This has a mutable answer. If culture dominates, the question becomes “Who are you?” – an answer which can be changed less easily.
There is a good side and a bad side. Choose wisely
A more benign analysis maintains that European leaders have built on common civilizational foundations since 1945, forging a niche for Europe in the face of increasingly powerful allies and rivals, be it America, Russia or China. “The concept of EU because the civilizational state is so deeply rooted in European politics now that it shapes the rhetoric of all the political actors who participate in it, “said Alexander Clarkson, historian at King’s College London. In short, the desire has always been there, but now it has a natty name.
If the vision of Mr. Macron and his comrades triumphs, then this civilizational turn does not need to have a dark side. Limiting “universal” values to the European sphere shows a lack of ambition but practical acceptance EUPlace in an increasingly non-liberal world order dominated by America and China. However, the risks of this change are also obvious. A paranoid continent, fearing for its sustainability, is not one that makes healthy decisions. Emphasizing specifically European values could lead to chauvinism. A political class that echoes far-right tropes about replacement risks feeding the very populists they want to hunt. A die EUThe crowning achievement has tempered the nationalism that started two world wars in the space of three decades. Replacing “nationalism” with a crude form of “civilizationalism” would be pointless. As Huntington might have said, a clash of states of civilization would be truly ugly. ■
This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the title “Huntington’s disease”