gERMANY OWNS no nuclear weapons. He gave up on the idea even when it was reunified in 1990. But if war were to break out in Europe today, German pilots could climb on German planes, take off from Büchel air base in Rhineland-Palatinate and drop nuclear bombs on Russian troops.
The Luftwaffe can do it thanks to NATOGermany’s nuclear sharing system, in which America discreetly places nuclear bombs in five European countries. The arrangement is decades old. But that has been raising questions for some time – and the clashes involving one of these nuclear hosts, Turkey, make matters worse. As NATO leaders meet in London for summit next week, Turkey’s bombings will remain in many heads.
In 1950, America moved its first bombs to Britain. Over the next decades, he hid a vast supply of nuclear weapons across Europe, more than 7,000 at their peak in 1971. Many were small devices called tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. They were able to explode with yields as low as a fraction of a kiloton, much smaller than the 15-kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The smallest of them could fit in a backpack.
Today only about 150 remain. These are B61 free-fall bombs whose output can be adjusted between a third of a kilotonne and over 170. They remain in the hands of the Americans in peacetime and could only be released by a presidential order – but European pilots are still training to drop them. Italy and Turkey are thought to have the most, perhaps 60 to 70 each, with smaller numbers in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
The bombs of most concern to US officials are stored in safes at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, a few hours’ drive from the Syrian border. During a military coup in 1960 and a diplomatic conflict in 1975, America considered removing the bombs. During the failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2016, Incirlik welcomed the tankers who enabled the renegade F-16 fighter planes to threaten Istanbul and Ankara. Erdogan’s regime responded by cutting power at the base and arresting its commander.
This has raised alarms in Washington over the security of its weapons and the risk of them becoming hostages in strained relations with Turkey. Senior officers were sent to Incirlik, only to conclude that the bombs did not need to be removed. The warheads can only be armed with a code, and the chests are automatically sealed if the power goes out, giving American forces time to fight their way to base if necessary. However, in recent years, America has considered repelling the bombs and replacing them with dummies.
Nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Greece in 2001 and from Ramstein air base in Germany in 2005. Removing the Incirlik bombs would eliminate vulnerable targets and the implied leverage. But if it is clumsy, it could worsen the diplomatic crisis and even prompt Erdogan to continue his own nuclear weapons program, which he hinted at in September. It would also revive a lively debate on the presence of B61s elsewhere in Europe.
Opposition to the sharing of nuclear energy has notably been simmering in Germany. Although Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has championed this practice, her coalition partners over the past decade have repeatedly called for the bombs to be dropped. Keeping them is also difficult for technical reasons. Europe’s current twin-capacity aircraft (DCA) – those who are wired to carry nuclear weapons as well as ordinary bombs – are nearing the end of their lives. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands all buy products F-35 as a replacement, but Germany excluded it in January.
This was partly due to France, which wants to build its own new generation warplane with Germany. The Luftwaffe could rather buy the F-18 years old, an older American DCA. Or it could modernize the European-built Typhoon to accommodate B61s. But in addition to being expensive and time consuming, it would expose European technology to American eyes. And none of the planes are particularly stealthy.
Incirlik is not the only cause of security problems either. In 2008, a review by the United States Air Force concluded that most European bases hosting weapons did not meet its standards. Support buildings, fences, lighting and security systems were all found to be in need of repair. Two years later, peace activists entered a base in Belgium and wandered near his B61 safes for one hour.
Time bomb
If the bombs are politically embarrassing and vulnerable, why keep them in Europe? Some NATO planners fear that if Russia attacks an ally like Estonia and then conducts a limited nuclear strike to prevent a western counterattack, it would not make sense for the alliance to react with “strategic” weapons – those that use missiles and longer range aircraft. which have much higher yields, destroying the city. Smaller bombs like the BThe 61 is believed to provide a proportional response.
However, it is not entirely clear that the enemy would appreciate this distinction. And the military case for B61s is doubtful for other reasons. The planes, if they were not destroyed on the ground, would have difficulty in crossing the Russian air defenses. Thus, America would probably use stealth bombers deployed across the Atlantic or missiles launched by submarines armed with a new low-performance warhead built under the Trump administration. NATO recognizes that its “supreme guarantee” is provided by the American, British and French strategic forces in this way, rather than by the B61s.
In truth, the aim of the nuclear sharing regime is more political than practical. The objective is to create a tangible and symbolic link between America and Europe. Allies benefiting from American nuclear protection must share the moral burden of nuclear use and the cost of possible reprisals. At the same time, Europeans have a say (even if they are still modest) on how US nuclear weapons could be used. It is believed to allay their fear of abandonment.
This insurance comes at a price. President Barack Obama toyed with the idea of bringing the bombs home, but ultimately postponed the decision. Instead, he authorized a $ 10 billion program to extend their lives and increase their accuracy. The total cost of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will reach $ 25 billion between 2017 and 2046, or about $ 1 billion per year. And if Turkey’s relations with its allies continue to collapse, Europeans may feel less appeased than alarmed by the several megatons of weapons installed at Incirlik. ■
This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the title “Over here”
