THE RUSSIAN CATHEDRAL of the Armed Forces was consecrated in 2020. It is located in Patriot Park, a military theme park in Kubinka, about 60 km west of Moscow. The church is khaki green, surmounted by a golden Orthodox cross. The diameter of the main dome, at 19.45 m, refers to the end of the Second World War. Nazi tanks were melted down to make the ground. Angels watch Russian soldiers in a mosaic commemorating the country’s role in Syria’s civil war, the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
In Russia, the church and the army go hand in hand. Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, implicitly supports Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. He spouts Kremlin propaganda, claiming that Russia is not the aggressor and that genocide is being perpetrated by Ukrainians against Russian speakers in Donbass. Nor is his endorsement of this war unique. During his tenure, Russian priests blessed bombs destined for Syria and Crimea. Bishop Stefan de Klin, who presides over the Cathedral of the Armed Forces, heads the church’s department for cooperation with the army. Before taking Holy Orders, he was an officer in the Missile Defense Force.
The Russian church was suppressed for decades under communism. Church property was seized by the state. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow was destroyed in 1931 to make way for a political congress center (it was never completed). But the link between faith and national identity has not been broken. In 2015, 71% of Russians identified as Orthodox and 57% said following the faith was an important part of what it meant to be Russian. Many perceive church as being of increasing importance in their lives, although few attend. This makes it a powerful propaganda tool – a channel through which to promote a unique view of Russian values, at odds with liberal Western societies.
This is probably why Mr. Putin has championed his resurgence. According to “First Person,” a collection of interviews with the Russian leader published in 2000, he wears a cross given to him by his mother when she had him secretly baptized as a baby. He has long chosen to present himself as a devout Orthodox Christian (charming George W. Bush, the former US president, with his piety) and promotes conservative religious values as a key tenet of nationalism. In 2007, he described nuclear armament and Orthodoxy as the two pillars of Russian society, guaranteeing the country’s external security and moral health respectively. But under Mr. Putin’s leadership, the church could be better seen as an internal security tool, promoting a vision of Russian identity consistent with his regime’s goals. It’s perhaps no surprise that when Pussy Riot, an all-girl punk band, protested their premiership in 2012, they did so in a Moscow cathedral.
Patriarch Kirill is a staunch ally of Mr. Putin. In 2012, he called his presidency a “miracle of God”. It certainly benefited the church. Under Mr Putin’s leadership, Russia has passed laws that restrict the rights of rival religious groups, salvaged religious items sold under communism and built thousands of churches. All of this has increased the power that religious leaders have to influence large sections of the population. In 2007, the church reunited with many Russian parishes outside the country, healing an 80-year rift. It also strengthened its power as a foreign policy tool in the diaspora.
Church support for the invasion of Ukraine benefits the Kremlin in two important ways. First, the church emphasizes historical ties between Ukraine and Russia. Kyiv, now the capital of Ukraine, was the seat of Orthodoxy when it arrived in 10th-century Russia, a kingdom that at its height spanned Belarus, Ukraine and the Western Russia. Moscow oversaw Ukraine’s only legitimate Orthodox Church until 2019, when a new Ukrainian Orthodox Church was proclaimed. Patriarch Cyril never accepted his autonomy. This month he described the peoples of Russia and Ukraine as coming “from a baptismal font in kyiv” and claimed they “share a common historical destiny”. This argument helps justify Russia’s spurious claims that it is liberating its neighbor.
Second, Patriarch Cyril has long attacked the West for its perceived decadence, pitting its “sinful nature” against conservative Russian values. He portrayed Ukraine’s breakaway regions as victims of encroaching liberal influence and seemed, bizarrely, to claim that the war was happening in part because the people of Donbass didn’t want gay pride parades thrown at them. imposed. In a letter responding to the World Council of Churches, which had called on him to mediate for peace, he said his country was not the aggressor and that the “tragic conflict” was now part of a “geopolitical strategy aimed, above all, at weakening Russia.
This unconditional support for Kremlin propaganda has divided the Church. More than 280 Russian Orthodox priests from around the world have signed an open letter condemning the invasion. Many Moscow clerical supporters in Ukraine now omit Patriarch Kirill from their prayers. A parish in Amsterdam resolved to leave the church; he intends to join the Istanbul-based Patriarchate of Constantinople, the oldest seat of Orthodoxy.
Dissent is unlikely to influence church leaders in Moscow. The patriarch has begun to frame the conflict as a holy war, with implications that he says go beyond politics. “We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical meaning, but a metaphysical one,” he warned the faithful in his sermon on Forgiveness Sunday, the last day before Lent in the Orthodox calendar. The mosaic in the Armed Forces Cathedral commemorating the Russian wars that God supposedly smiled on leaves room for future conflicts. Ukraine may soon join the list.
Read more about our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis