JWHERE TO GET ONE politician accused of spying for a foreign government can be considered a misfortune. But having two is certainly carelessness. In 2017, it was revealed that Yang Jian, a Chinese-born member of the New Zealand National Party, had worked for more than a decade at Chinese military training centres. He admitted to teaching spies (but not being one) but remained in his Kiwi job until 2020 when he retired. A few days later, a second child born in China deputy, Raymond Huo of the Labor government, said he was quitting politics. He too was accused of having ties to the Chinese Communist Party. New Zealand intelligence agencies had pushed both sides to remove the men.
Espionage is just one way China tries to influence New Zealand democracy. Donors linked to the Chinese government have given money to its two major parties. Chinese companies have hired incumbent Kiwi politicians. All of this has earned New Zealand a reputation for being weak on China and security. A report released by Canadian intelligence in 2018 called it “the soft underbelly” of Five Eyes, an intelligence-sharing pact between those two countries and America, Australia and Britain.
China accounts for around 30% of Kiwi exports, including many dairy and meat products. With just 5 million people, New Zealand fears it will be burdened with trade bans like those imposed on Australia. Unlike its larger neighbor, which has proven resilient to Chinese measures, it does not have a heap of iron ore to protect its economy from coercion, officials say.
Still, the country has recently gotten tough on its biggest trading partner. In recent years, Jacinda Ardern’s Labor government has changed a host of laws and policies, reflecting “a more lucid view of the challenges China presents”, as David Capie of Victoria University of Wellington puts it. This includes blocking Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications giant, from any involvement in the 5g network and strengthen foreign investment rules to include a “national interest test” (meaning deals can be voided if they are deemed a threat). Foreign political donations were banned. The government is planning further changes to the electoral law to make the identities of more donors public.
In its region, New Zealand has strengthened its diplomatic engagement with Pacific island states, which China is courting. At home, he tries to strengthen his defenses. Signals intelligence capabilities have been roughly doubled, says Andrew Little, the minister responsible for its intelligence agencies. A defense review is underway in response to what planners are now calling “challenges of a scale and magnitude unprecedented in our neighborhood.”
New Zealand used to be shy of open criticism. But in the past two years, he has joined more than 20 international statements criticizing China’s actions in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and elsewhere, points out Anne-Marie Brady, of the University of Canterbury, who studies the Chinese interference. “Thinking has changed dramatically in government since 2018,” she says. In public, New Zealand always talks about its trade relationship with China. In the private sector, it encourages exporters to diversify into other markets. The firmer line does not sit well with China. His embassy in Wellington warns that ‘wrong accusations’ could derail the relationship.
China watchers in New Zealand wonder if this more assertive stance will last. An election is scheduled for next year. The National Party, if it won, might adopt a more timid line, emphasizing business rather than security. John Key, a former national prime minister, says he doesn’t see China “as the aggressor everyone sees” and cautions against “inflammatory language”. The party would not hesitate to voice its concerns, says its foreign affairs spokesman, Gerry Brownlee (who recently came under fire for saying China was “dealing with a terrorist problem” in Xinjiang). But “let’s not create an enemy where an enemy might not exist”.■
