Critics of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 have always believed that the real motivation was to take control of the second largest proven oil reserves in the world.
Even the architects of Operation Iraqi Freedom were convinced that Iraqi oil revenues would quickly fund the reconstruction of an American client state that would help reshape the Middle East in America’s favor. But if oil and influence were the price, then it looks like China, not America, ultimately won the Iraq war and its aftermath – never firing a shot.
Today, China, the world’s largest importer of crude oil, is Iraq’s largest trading partner. Only Russia sells more oil to Beijing. In the first half of this year, Iraqi oil shipments to China increased by nearly 30% from the previous year and accounted for more than a third of Iraq’s total exports. During a visit to Beijing last year, Adel Abdul Mahdi, then Iraqi Prime Minister, described Sino-Iraqi relations as on the verge of a “leap forward” and his Minister of Electricity wrote : “China is our first option as a long-term strategic partner. ”
Meanwhile, Iraqi oil exports to the United States nearly halved in the first half of the year, and the Pentagon plans to cut its remaining troops in Iraq by a third in the coming months.
A similar dynamic is playing out in Afghanistan, as America’s longest war finally draws to a close. Afghan and Pakistani officials told the Financial Times that Beijing effectively controls the peace process and promises the Taliban massive investments in energy and infrastructure once the United States is gone for good.
China’s influence is growing rapidly across the Middle East at a time when US engagement is called into question by regional allies and US politicians. Beijing is the largest foreign investor in the region and has sealed strategic partnerships with all Gulf states except Bahrain. Most of the investment has gone to traditional US allies, many of whom are also avid clients of Chinese military technology.
The very first Chinese military base abroad was established in Djibouti three years ago. But Beijing is also investing heavily in commercial ports that could easily be converted to naval use in other strategic locations, including the Pakistani port of Gwadar and the Oman port of Duqm, on either side of the Gulf of Oman.
With the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, China considers the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab as essential to its economic and military survival since most of its energy imports is routed through these strategic choke points.
As China-U.S. Relations deteriorate, Beijing’s goal of increasing control of these waterways and reducing America’s ability to cut them off in conflict has become increasingly urgent. This is the main reason why China has built a navy that is now larger, if not more advanced, than that of the United States.
Until recently, Beijing had followed a policy of non-intervention in the Middle East of being everyone’s friend but none of them. The success of this project has been demonstrated as it negotiates a $ 400 billion investment and security pact with Iran while aiding Iran’s enemy to Saudi Arabia with its nuclear program. And it fully supports the Palestinian cause while urging Israel to share cutting-edge technology and lease key strategic ports to Chinese state-owned enterprises.
But perhaps the most powerful sign of China’s growing influence in the region is the fact that nearly all Muslim-majority countries have supported the incarceration of as many as 2 million Muslims in re-education camps in western China. In public statements and joint letters to the UN, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates have all lauded the camps and the suppression of Islam in the Xinjiang region as necessary “counterterrorism and de-radicalization” efforts that brought “happiness, fulfillment and security”.
In the United States, two successive presidents have been elected on the promise of pulling the country out of the tangles of the Middle East. In the wake of the shale oil revolution, with America now virtually self-sufficient in energy, the justification for pouring more blood and treasure in the sand seems slim.
Washington’s resistance to playing the role of regional policeman when other countries, especially China, reap the full benefits, has been evident for some time. It was the administration of Barack Obama who first proposed the “pivot to Asia” to refocus American diplomatic and military power on Asia-Pacific and counter the rise of China as a hegemony. regional. President Donald Trump has accelerated this strategy.
But what appears to be a compelling argument for America’s withdrawal from the Middle East is now complicated by China’s rapid progress there. If the goal of the United States is to contain China’s ambitions in Asia and consolidate its close allies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, withdrawing from the Middle East is the last thing to do.
Most Asian countries are even more dependent on on-board oil than China. Handing over control of the main waterways around the Arabian Peninsula to Beijing would force all countries in Asia to rethink their strategic alliances and make them much more vulnerable to the kind of coercive diplomacy China uses around the world.
Anyone who wins the US presidential election in November will be faced with the uncomfortable reality that competition and containment from China now runs through the Middle East.
Critics of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 have always believed that the real motivation was to take control of the second largest proven oil reserves in the world.
Even the architects of Operation Iraqi Freedom were convinced that Iraqi oil revenues would quickly fund the reconstruction of an American client state that would help reshape the Middle East in America’s favor. But if oil and influence were the price, then it looks like China, not America, ultimately won the Iraq war and its aftermath – never firing a shot.
Today, China, the world’s largest importer of crude oil, is Iraq’s largest trading partner. Only Russia sells more oil to Beijing. In the first half of this year, Iraqi oil shipments to China increased by nearly 30% from the previous year and accounted for more than a third of Iraq’s total exports. During a visit to Beijing last year, Adel Abdul Mahdi, then Iraqi Prime Minister, described Sino-Iraqi relations as on the verge of a “leap forward” and his Minister of Electricity wrote : “China is our first option as a long-term strategic partner. ”
Meanwhile, Iraqi oil exports to the United States nearly halved in the first half of the year, and the Pentagon plans to cut its remaining troops in Iraq by a third in the coming months.
A similar dynamic is playing out in Afghanistan, as America’s longest war finally draws to a close. Afghan and Pakistani officials told the Financial Times that Beijing effectively controls the peace process and promises the Taliban massive investments in energy and infrastructure once the United States is gone for good.
China’s influence is growing rapidly across the Middle East at a time when US engagement is called into question by regional allies and US politicians. Beijing is the largest foreign investor in the region and has sealed strategic partnerships with all Gulf states except Bahrain. Most of the investment has gone to traditional US allies, many of whom are also avid clients of Chinese military technology.
The very first Chinese military base abroad was established in Djibouti three years ago. But Beijing is also investing heavily in commercial ports that could easily be converted to naval use in other strategic locations, including the Pakistani port of Gwadar and the Oman port of Duqm, on either side of the Gulf of Oman.
With the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, China considers the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab as essential to its economic and military survival since most of its energy imports is routed through these strategic choke points.
As China-U.S. Relations deteriorate, Beijing’s goal of increasing control of these waterways and reducing America’s ability to cut them off in conflict has become increasingly urgent. This is the main reason why China has built a navy that is now larger, if not more advanced, than that of the United States.
Until recently, Beijing had followed a policy of non-intervention in the Middle East of being everyone’s friend but none of them. The success of this project has been demonstrated as it negotiates a $ 400 billion investment and security pact with Iran while aiding Iran’s enemy to Saudi Arabia with its nuclear program. And it fully supports the Palestinian cause while urging Israel to share cutting-edge technology and lease key strategic ports to Chinese state-owned enterprises.
But perhaps the most powerful sign of China’s growing influence in the region is the fact that nearly all Muslim-majority countries have supported the incarceration of as many as 2 million Muslims in re-education camps in western China. In public statements and joint letters to the UN, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates have all lauded the camps and the suppression of Islam in the Xinjiang region as necessary “counterterrorism and de-radicalization” efforts that brought “happiness, fulfillment and security”.
In the United States, two successive presidents have been elected on the promise of pulling the country out of the tangles of the Middle East. In the wake of the shale oil revolution, with America now virtually self-sufficient in energy, the justification for pouring more blood and treasure in the sand seems slim.
Washington’s resistance to playing the role of regional policeman when other countries, especially China, reap the full benefits, has been evident for some time. It was the administration of Barack Obama who first proposed the “pivot to Asia” to refocus American diplomatic and military power on Asia-Pacific and counter the rise of China as a hegemony. regional. President Donald Trump has accelerated this strategy.
But what appears to be a compelling argument for America’s withdrawal from the Middle East is now complicated by China’s rapid progress there. If the goal of the United States is to contain China’s ambitions in Asia and consolidate its close allies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, withdrawing from the Middle East is the last thing to do.
Most Asian countries are even more dependent on on-board oil than China. Handing over control of the main waterways around the Arabian Peninsula to Beijing would force all countries in Asia to rethink their strategic alliances and make them much more vulnerable to the kind of coercive diplomacy China uses around the world.
Anyone who wins the US presidential election in November will be faced with the uncomfortable reality that competition and containment from China now runs through the Middle East.